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Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist
Era: The Case of Ukraine (with Special References to
Orthodoxy and Human Rights Issues)
Victor Yelensky∗
I. RELIGION, CHURCH, AND STATE IN UKRAINE ON THE EVE OF
THE FALL OF COMMUNISM
A. Communist Religious Policy
Up to the beginning of Gorbachev’s reforms in Ukraine,1 there
were over six thousand officially functioning religious communities
(one-third of the religious organizations in the Soviet Union). This
number included four thousand Orthodox parishes (65% of the religious communities in Ukraine), more than eleven hundred communities of Evangelical Christian-Baptists, about one hundred communities of Roman Catholics, and eighty communities of the Church of
Reformation of Trans-Carphathian’s Hungarians and others.
The “Regulations Concerning the Religious Organizations in the
Ukrainian SSR” defined the legal basis for the activity of religious
organizations in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.2 This law,
which mainly reproduced the Stalinist legislation of 1929, was issued
in 1976. In addition, a great number of special instructions existed
that led to an even more severe attitude towards churches. The violation of the minimal set of rights granted to believers was an ordinary
phenomenon.
The number of official church institutions in no way reflected the
real religious needs of the Ukrainian population. The authorities artificially restrained the increase of church institutions; the Communist
party and state organizations concentrated their efforts on reducing
∗ Victor Yelensky, Ph.D., is a Senior Researcher at the Philosophy Institute of
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Editor of the Journal for Religious Studies, “Lyudina i
Svit” (Individual and World). He is also President of the Ukrainian branch of the International
Religious Liberty Association.
1. The Ukraine is a Soviet Republic with a population of fifty-two million.
2. Regulations Concerning the Religious Organizations in the Ukrainian SSR (1976).
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the religious activity of the population, setting up harsh and comprehensive control over the church, and limiting the church’s functions to only ritual practice.3
Most religious communities in Ukraine worked unofficially.4 In
fact, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church existed underground,
where despite difficult conditions it managed to preserve its bishops,
monks, clerics, and continuity of tradition.5 The communities of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Reformed Baptists,6 and a significant part of
the Pentecostal Christians, survived in a similar manner.7 The structures, parallel to the official ones, occurred in Catholicism, Judaism,
and many of the Protestant denominations.8
Moreover, at times during the past twenty years, the populations
of many cities and villages (mainly in western Ukraine) have petitioned for permission to open Orthodox temples. In 1985, these petitions came from 173 Ukrainian towns; however, none of the petitions were granted.
At the same time, the Soviet state implemented an extensive antireligious propaganda campaign as a part of the political indoctrination of the people. A solid infrastructure contributed to the effectiveness of this effort. The farther from Moscow and the closer to the
provinces, the more intensive the propaganda was.9 Disagreements
about the limitations on churches may have existed between: (a) the
pragmatically disposed, foreign economic departments, including the
KGB’s cultural apparatus and (b) the propagandist services and local
party organizations. Yet, these disagreements were usually solved in

3. See VICTOR YELENSKY, DERZHAVNO-TSERKOVKI VZAEMINI V. UKRAINE: 1917–
1990 (1991).
4. According to one estimate, approximately 1200 unregistered sectarian groups operated illegally in the Soviet Union in 1985. D. A. Loeber, Church and State, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF SOVIET LAW 103, 104 (F.J.M. Feldbrugge et al. eds., 2d ed. 1985).
5. “The Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church acknowledges the primacy of the Pope,
but retains the Eastern (Byzantine) Rite. This church, known as the Uniate Church, lost its
independence in 1946 when it was re-united under pressure with the Russian Orthodox
Church in Moscow.” Loeber, supra note 4, at 104. Many Uniates persisted in professing their
faith, although forced to do so underground. Id.
6. The Reformed Baptists broke away from the recognized association, the All-Union
Council of Baptists, which had been established in 1944. See id.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., JAMES THROWER, MARXIST-LENINIST “SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM” AND THE
STUDY OF RELIGION AND ATHEISM IN THE USSR (1983).
9. During the “transitive” regimes of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko,
around one million atheistic lectures were given in the Soviet Union every year.
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favor of the group that stood for uncompromising limitations of religious activity and, especially, for manifestation of national and religious distinctiveness.10
B. Religiosity in Ukraine Before the Great Transformation
The achievements of the Ukrainian Communist administration in
its efforts to substitute some secular ersatz-religion for religiousness
were much more humble than was officially declared.11
Unfortunately, no reliable data is available to characterize the religious identification of the Ukrainian population in the 1970s and
1980s. Several factors render the sociological research from that period unreliable. These factors are: (a) a lack of trustworthy data accumulated by Soviet sociologists of religion; (b) peculiarities of the
Marxist-Leninist view of religion, as described sometimes in empirical material; (c) the self-isolation of Soviet society and inclination of
many faithful in the Soviet Union, particularly highly-educated persons who held social positions, to anonymously withhold their viewpoint, which presumably meant religiousness was higher than reported in this area; (d) subordination of religious studies to
sociological methods with the aim of overcoming religion; and (e)
outspoken “understatements” in the interpretation of the existing
data. Significantly, in one treatise, the authors not only avoided estimating the level of religiousness throughout the Soviet Union, but
also failed to report on the main results of their research on religions.12 For instance, according to the results of representative investigation in Belorussia (ten thousand people were questioned in five
to six regions of the republic), a detailed study of the socialdemographic structure of what was termed a “religious” contingent
had been conducted. However, there are no reports pertaining to
the percentage of believers in this contingent in any of ten thousand

10. In 1929, the government revoked the right of registered religions to spread “religious propaganda.” In contrast, the government continued to uphold and employ its freedom
to “spread atheist propaganda.” See Loeber, supra note 4, at 107 (citing U.S.S.R. CONST. art.
52 (1977)). This encouragement of atheist propaganda and prohibition of religious propaganda made religious freedom in the Soviet Union a mere pretense. See id. at 109.
11. Nikolay Berdyayev correctly asserted that totalitarianism by itself strives to be a
church.
12. KONKRETNIE ISSLEDOVANIYA SOVREMENNIH RELIGIOZNIH VEROVANIJ:
METODIKA, ORGANIZATSIYA, REZULTATI 63–83 (Moscow 1967).
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cases.13 Similarly, the treatise presents another study that had been
conducted in Sumska, Ternopilska, Ivano-Frankivska, Zakarpatska,
Chernigivska, and other regions of Ukraine.14
Based on this evidence, we might assume that these results, obtained in a process of wide-scale investigations, were dissonant with
the prevailing theoretical scheme—that the Soviet Union was a
country of “mass atheism.”
Analyzing the fragments of empirical material that had been accumulated in a process of concrete-sociological research of religiousness in the Soviet Union from the mid 1960s to the beginning of the
1980s, William Fletcher comes to the conclusion that 45% of the
population of the Soviet Union were believers. Fletcher also found
evidence to counter the Russian sociologists’ belief that religion was
a phenomenon of the past that had been dying at the time of the
1917 Revolution.15 Nevertheless, as Fletcher points out, the mentioned index is only an “average.” For the regions with an absolute
predomination of Russians, it is high; but for the areas where Islam is
widespread, as well as for Lithuania and western Ukraine, it is low.16
The outline of arguments proposed by Fletcher seems to be
somewhat theoretical and abstract (mainly due to the limited empirical data that was available). Nonetheless, Fletcher’s conclusions appear to be much more realistic than official declarations, such as the
statement that the vast majority of Soviet people are neither influenced by nor members of any religion.17
Secret reports, submitted by party officials, reveal that in 1985,
the first year of Gorbachev’s reforms, 26% of newborns were baptized. Nearly 3% consecrated their marriage in a church, and over
40% of the dead were buried with a church’s assistance. Notably, the
figures on baptism and funerals performed by the Catholic Church in
the Netherlands that same year did not essentially differ from the
figures in Ukraine.18 Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian figures are seri-

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. WILLIAM C. FLETCHER, SOVIET BELIEVERS: THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR OF THE
POPULATION 14–15, 211–13 (1981).
16. See id. at 69–70.
17. See id. at 211–13.
18. See Lilian Voyé & Karel Dobbelaere, Roman Catholicism: Universalism at Stake, in
RELIGIONS SANS FRONTIERES? PRESENT AND FUTURE TRENDS OF MIGRATION, CULTURE,
AND COMMUNICATION 83, 92 (Roberto Cipriani ed., 1993).
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ously underestimated. They do not include baptisms and funerals
conducted by underground religious institutions, by clergymen in
private, or by those not registered in a special book. In the big cities,
these practices were common.
C. Church and Society
During the period of Brezhnev’s stagnation, religion was firmly
considered by the thinking public as an alternative system of values
that could uncompromisingly withstand the official ideology and
slogans, the untenability of which became more and more obvious.
Noticing the increase of adult baptism, the obsession of the intelligentsia with religious literature, the growing popularity of religious
broadcasting of foreign radio stations, and the outspoken neglect to
the atheistic propaganda and other materials, party officials expressed
anxiety over the anti-Communist trend of the spiritual processes in
the country.
The church, apart from being the mystical body of Christ (i.e.,
the Eternal Church), was also a social institution that could not remain aloof from and indifferent to the effects of social development.
From a sociological perspective, the existence of religious organizations in the former Soviet bloc countries required maintaining a difficult confrontational position vis-à-vis the state. In this relationship,
the church needed to fight to preserve its “independence.”19 The
church also had to face the very real problem of its future existence.
Essentially, the church was forcibly removed from the sphere of social service; this action, according to church leaders, was a matter of
principle.
The church had no right to engage in missionary work or in
evangelism. It could not even take care of the poor or act as a spiritual guide for people. Consequently, its status as an impotent institution was crystallized.
Under these conditions, it is unlikely that religious institutions in
post-Communist countries on the whole, and in Ukraine in particular, would be able to develop a synthetic religious point of view concerning church activity in the post-totalitarian landscape. These religious institutions were probably not capable of immediately finding
adequate answers to the challenges posed by society. Weakened reli19. In fact, the church has been fighting to secure its independence for nearly 2000
years.
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gious institutions had to deal with a barrage of contradictions—a
barrage initiated by the repressive Soviet regime.
After the fall of the Communist regime, a conflict that may be
described as a “conflict of anticipations” soon appeared. Caused by a
difference between the expectations placed upon the church after the
fall of the Communist regime and the actual social and cultural
potential of the church and its clergy, this “conflict of anticipations”
lasted only during the 1990s.
II. RELIGION, RELIGIOSITY, AND CHURCHES IN THE
CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE
A. The Institutional Religion
The real changes in the religious situation in Ukraine started in
mid-1988, the year of the thousandth anniversary of Rus’s baptism.
Beginning in mid-1988, “the new way of thinking” of the Kremlin
finally affected the sphere of church-state relations. During Gorbachev’s first years in power, legal and secret restrictions on religious
practices were somewhat relaxed, and by 1989, all religious prisoners
and deportees were allowed to return home. Among those released
were a number of Uniate priests and religious freedom defenders.
In August 1987, a group of bold Greek Catholic clergymen and
lay activists declared their emergence from the underground and appealed to Pope John Paul II for help in the restoration of the
church’s rights. In October 1989, a large Orthodox parish in Lviv
declared itself to be of the Uniate faith. Hundreds of other churches
followed suit. In November 1989, the Ukrainian Council for Religious Affairs offered to allow registration of individual congregations
of Uniates. A few days later, the Pope met President Gorbachev in
the Vatican.
Beginning in 1989, hundreds20 of Russian Orthodox Church
parishes (mostly in western Ukraine) declared themselves as belonging to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (“UAOC”).21

20. Orest Subtelny estimates that approximately 1650 parishes had defected from the
Russian Orthodox Church to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (“UAOC”) by June 1990.
OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 579 (2d ed. 1994).
21. UAOC had not had a presence in Ukraine since the 1930s and had been based
abroad. When the UAOC re-emerged in 1990, it began to compete “for Orthodox loyalties.”
Id. at 578–79.
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At its All-Ukrainian Council in Kiev in June 1990, the UAOC proclaimed itself a Patriarchate and elected as its first patriarch ninetytwo-year-old Mstyslav Skrypnyk, the head of the UAOC in the
West.22 Skrypnyk was the only surviving hierarch from the “second”
UAOC, which dated back to World War II.23
From 1988 to 1990, there was a mass opening of formerly closed
temples, monasteries, and ecclesiastical schools. The number of religious communities increased an average of 32% every year during
that period. In 1990, the growth rate was 30%, which decreased each
year until 1997: 1992—less than 8%; 1993—6.5%; 1994—5.5%;
1995—6.6%; 1996–1997—less than 5%. By 2001, one religious
community in Ukraine corresponded to nearly two thousand inhabitants; this number is higher, however, than in neighboring countries
that formerly were the part of the Soviet Union.
Over half of the religious communities in Ukraine are Orthodox,
20% are Greek-Catholic, and the other 20% are Protestants of various
trends. Although Protestant churches make up a large percentage of
the total number of churches, those who attend protestant churches
add up to a small percentage of the total number of church-going
Ukrainians. Of the respondents who consider themselves religious,
72.0% belong to Orthodox Churches, 17.0% belong to the Greek
Catholic Church, 5.3% belong to Muslim communities, 2.2% belong
to different Protestant congregations, 1.6% belong to the Roman
Catholic Church, and approximately 1.2% do not belong to any religious group. Approximately half of the religious communities in
Ukraine are located in the seven western Ukrainian regions. Notably,
these regions are inhabited by only 18% of the whole population of
the country. Before World War II, these territories (slightly more
than 18% of the area of Ukraine with its present borders), were outside of Soviet Union’s boundaries. In this region, the older generation managed to obtain more or less satisfactory religious instruction
and the Soviet transformation was conducted without the degree of
brutal eradication of religious institutions that occurred in the Soviet
Ukraine. Thus, the church preserved the functions of social communication, ethnic identification, and moral arbitration. In eastern and
southern Ukraine, the church practically lost these functions.
22. See id. at 579.
23. The “first” UAOC was the ecclesiastical body that proclaimed itself independent
from the Moscow Patriarchate in October 1921 and was forced underground by the Soviet
regime in the 1930s.
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The difference between the levels of religious culture in western
Ukraine and eastern Ukraine is essential. The level of declaration of
religiousness in western Ukraine, particularly in the three regions of
Eastern Galicia, where the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church dominates, is 3 to 3.5 times higher than in eastern Ukraine. For instance,
in the Ternopilska region, in western Ukraine, there is one religious
community per each 688 inhabitants; in Khakiv, in eastern Ukraine,
there is one religious community per each 4880 inhabitants.
B. The Level of Religiosity
The number of Ukrainians who declare themselves to be religious is increasing rather quickly: in 1997, 64% of those questioned
declared themselves to be religious.24 The level of confessional identification is quite high too; the percentage of those who consider
themselves believers but do not identify themselves with any religious institution is 3% or less. The portion of people who attend
church services regularly (i.e., more often than once a month) is
19%; this figure places Ukraine approximately into the middle of the
Central-Eastern European pyramid, behind Catholic Hungary, but
ahead of the Czech Republic, eastern Germany, Latvia, and Estonia.25
However, the church’s role in post-Communist Ukraine seems
to be rather paradoxical. On one hand, up to 75% of the Ukrainian
population trust the church more than any other social institution.
Neither the president, the government, the parliament, nor the army
can compete with the church on the subject of trust in public opinion polls. Based on the powerful impulse of social “advancement”
given to the church in the 1980s, there was a hope that numerous
problems, unsolvable by official institutions, would be solved by unofficial institutions. The most structured of the unofficial institutions
were religious organizations.
The number of respondents stating that religion was helpful for
society essentially exceeded the number that considered religion as
beneficial for them personally. But the church often appears to be
unable to provide actual support of political projects by means of its

24. See Survey, Democratic Initiatives Foundations, at http://www.ukma.kiev.ua/
pub/DI/di.htm.
25. Cf. PAUL M. ZULEHNER, KIRCHEN IM UBERGANG IN FREIHEITLICHE
GESELLSCHAFTEN 31 (1994).
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own believers. And this is true not only in Ukraine, but also in many
other post-Communist countries.
III. THE UKRAINIAN CHURCHES AND POST-COMMUNIST
CHALLENGES
A. The Rural Background of Ukrainian Religious Life
A fundamental fact to remember is that the Ukrainian culture has
always been essentially, if not mostly, a rural culture. The social
structure of Ukrainian society ironically has been defined as consisting of “a priest and a peasant.” Furthermore, neighboring political
and cultural centers influenced the Ukrainian aristocracy; as a result,
these centers were “Polonized” or “Russianized.” The return to the
cultural roots of one’s ancestors, like the return made by the future
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytski, was the exception to the rule.26
Within quite a short time—approximately forty years—Ukraine
has transformed from an almost completely rural nation into a nation
that is mainly urbanized (in 1998, there were seven cities in Ukraine
with populations of more than one million each). The Stalinist industrialization, which began after World War II, consisted of the
merciless house-breaking and suppression of peasants, the physical
extermination of peasants, and the peasants’ permanent exodus from
ruined villages. These events destroyed the traditional Ukrainian cultural archetype drastically—so drastically, in fact, that the preservation in such circumstances of surviving elements of traditional religious culture can be regarded as a manifestation of the high viability
of Ukrainian ethos.
B. Post-Communist Challenges
The dramatic migration of people from the fields to the cities has
resulted in the development of a specific type of religious culture in

26. Metropolitan Sheptytskyi came from an aristocratic Polish-Ukrainian family that had
become Polonized (in the male line of descent) at least a century before his birth. His maternal
grandfather was a well-known Polish playwright, Count Alexander Fredro, whose family was
Catholic of the Roman rite. Thus, Sheptytskyi’s decision in favor of the nationality of his forefathers and his transfer to the Eastern (Greek) culture came as a shock, first to his family, then
to Polish society. See Ryszard Torzecki, Sheptyts’kyi and Polish Society, in MORALITY AND
REALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS’KYI 75–98 (Paul Robert Magocsi &
Andrii Krawchuk eds., 1989).
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Ukrainian cities. This religious culture, metaphorically speaking,
could hardly be translated into language that is common for the contemporary megapolis. This incongruity between traditional religious
culture and city life became especially obvious when the historical
churches of Ukraine began to severely compete with Protestant
churches and missions of Western origin. While the traditional
churches of Ukraine exhausted themselves trying to withstand the
Soviet regime, these traditional churches also tried to preserve their
own tradition. Very often, a new social or political development
meant for these churches a return to the pre-Soviet status quo. However, not only seven decades, but the entire twentieth century had
passed. During that time, the Second Vatican Council took place,
there were breakthroughs in Protestant theology, and the postOsvenzym and post-Gulag theologies held significant influence. All
of this changed the traditional churches as compared to their state in
the pre-Soviet era. In addition, there were achievements in the
evangelization of “Homo urbanus,” which were made by the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Churches.
The dissatisfaction of Orthodox and Greek-Catholic believers–
dissatisfaction with the intensity of religious life and with the role of
religious communities in satisfying social and cultural needs—was
most strongly revealed in the cities. It is apparent that the elevated
level of dissatisfaction results from the way religion is communicated
in the city, where immediate contact is replaced with indirect communication with ever-increasing frequency.
As a result, the development of neo-Protestant trends in cities
appears to be more dynamic than the development of historical
trends. In the cities, Protestant institutions developed effective missionary operations, which depended on mobile missionary groups
that have experience and great financial potential. Suffice it to say
that only 29% of all missions operating today in Ukraine were
founded by Orthodox and Catholics; the others were founded by
Protestants. In many big cities, Protestant communities are beginning to outnumber Orthodox ones.
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IV. THE POSITION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
A. The Religious Minorities Under the Soviet Regime

Although it varied over time, the Soviet regime’s attitude toward
minority religions was determined by the Soviet regime’s general approach to religion and religious institutions. During the Lenin period, religious minorities were considered a serious counterbalance to
the Russian Orthodox Church, which was an integrated element of
the tsarist regime and, consequently, represented a special danger to
the Bolsheviks. During the years of the Stalinist terror, religious minorities were persecuted with the same ferocity as the Orthodox
Church. Yet by the time Stalin’s so-called National Economic Policy
(“NEP”) connected with the constitutionalization of the Stalin empire with “the main people,” the situation had changed. The Russian
Orthodox Church was integrated into the ideological state device.
Thus, loyalty of religious minorities to the state became the subject
of suspicion, and pressure on religious minorities grew.
During the Brezhnev period, the attitude of the regime to religious minorities was formed through interaction of the following
factors:
1. The state’s attempts to prevent the formation of a union of
ethnic minorities dedicated to national liberation and based upon religious feelings and institutions;
2. The necessity of maintaining, for the sake of the West, a facade of observance of human rights and freedoms for religious minorities based on the notion that the West used these issues as an instrument of pressure against the Soviet Union; and
3. The desire to restrict religious activity that eventually was a
danger to the Soviet system. Notably, religious minorities were the
group that demonstrated the most significant resistance to the regime and achieved prominent successes in dissemination of their beliefs and defense of their religious dignity.
Finally, during his visit to Poland, Mikhail Gorbachev recognized
that “we, the communists, did a great deal of damage with respect to
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the Church.”27 It was the first recognition by a figure in the Soviet
hierarchy of the absurdity inherent in the Soviet model of churchstate relations. Four years later, while summarizing the results of his
reforms, the first and last Soviet Union president, in spite of the embarrassment caused by attacks from his enemies and former comrades, still had a right to conclude that religious freedom in the Soviet Union had become a reality.
The liberalization process in Ukraine dragged behind that in
Moscow. The old Communist party elite that severely administered
the situation in the country blocked the way for a majority of the innovations in Gorbachev’s spirit “of new thinking.” By the end of
1988 and the beginning of 1989, the Communist leadership of
Ukraine embodied the last group who had yet to retreat from the orthodox Stalinist views on religious freedom. This last group encouraged the “establishing of special relations” and union with the hierarchy of the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox church in
the struggle with “anticommunism and nationalism.” At the same
time, this group sought strict prohibition against the revival of the
prohibited Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.
According to the plan of the creators of this last edition of the
church-state relations model in the Soviet Ukraine, religious minorities had to observe a favorable neutrality toward the regime in this
struggle. This neutrality was supposed to be brought about by giving
more freedom to religious minorities while canceling numerous restrictive regulations adopted previously during the time of
Khruschev’s anti-religious policies of the 1950s–1960s.
The struggle of the new regime with the Ukrainian Catholics and
the regime’s struggle against the movement for independence of the
Ukrainian Orthodoxy from the Moscow Patriarchy created opportunities for religious minorities in Ukraine to restore their institutional
structure, to establish close relations with coreligionists abroad, and
to develop missionary activity.
B. Religious Minorities in Contemporary Ukraine
Many experts predicted in the second half of the 1980s that the
growth of nationalism and the struggle for national identity in

27. Mikhail Gorbachev, Meeting with Representatives of Polish Intelligentsia (1988).
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Ukraine would be followed immediately by especially strong persecution of religious and ethnic minorities. A decade later, one can assert
that the transition period in Ukraine turned out to be more complicated than in many other post-Communist countries. But there is
something quite different as well; namely, in Ukraine, religious and
ethnic minorities feel far more comfortable than their partners in the
majority of other eastern European countries.
A sufficiently complicated and interconnected network of factors
contributed to the current situation. The most significant among
them may be arranged in five groups.
1. Religious configuration in Ukraine
Several centers of religious power exist in the Ukraine. This fact
prevents any one of these power centers from dominating over religious minorities or from conducting repressive or even restrictive
policy toward them. These power centers function as rivals, addressing their own sector of public opinion and their own corresponding
circles of political elite. They create a kind of balance that prevents
the establishment of a religious institution that would dominate supremely over others and with which one might identify (de facto if
not de jure) the Ukrainian state. As Bohdan R. Bociurkiw wrote,
[t]he overall religious picture of contemporary Ukraine is that of
religious pluralism more publicly tolerated than in Russia. This
challenges the traditional view of Ukraine as an Orthodox-Uniate
Country. It reflects . . . the more complicated ethnic composition
of Ukraine—a product of both forcible transfers of various nationalities and greater demographic mobility.28

2. Ukraine’s liberal church-state legislation
This legislative model has defects typical for the post-Soviet
countries. However, with the exemption of the Amendment to the
Article 24 of the Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations,” this model is extremely favorable for religious minorities.29

28. Bohdan Bociurkiw, Politics and Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek
Catholics, in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 131,
152 (Michael Bourdeaux ed., 1995).
29. UKR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 24 (1996).
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3. The special position of ethnic minorities
Two ethnic groups, Jews and Muslims, are significant because
they are the largest ethnic minorities in Ukraine for which religion is
a core part of their ethnic identity. The Jewish community consists of
about one-half million, and the community of Crimean Tatars consists of almost 300,000 members. These two communities are considered important allies in strengthening Ukrainian statehood, and
they are in fact such allies. With the exception of some extremists,
the Ukrainian dissidents in the Brezhnev era considered the Jewish
and Crimean-Tatar right-defenders as comrades in the anti-imperial
struggle. After Ukraine attained its independence, many Ukrainian
dissidents occupied important positions in society. Ukrainian history
is indebted to them for the opportunity to overturn at the end of the
twentieth century the universality of the bitter statement by the great
Jewish historian Shimon Dubnow, who wrote: “The experience has
proved that any explosion of the national passions among any people
first of all aggravates the attitude of this same people to the Jews living among them.”30
4. Tolerance towards other faiths
The Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s tradition of a sufficiently tolerant attitude towards the adherents of other faiths is an important distinction between Ukrainian and Moscow Orthodoxy. After the Kiev
metropoly became connected with the Moscow Patriarchy in the
seventeenth century, this tolerance of other faiths, openness to Western ideas, and freedom to communicate with non-Orthodox groups
brought on the severe criticism of the Moscow hierarchy against the
Kiev priesthood.
5. Historical influence
Finally, it is evident that predictions concerning possible future
development of interreligious and interethnical processes in Ukraine
after attaining state independence were constructed in many cases
under the influence of historical reminiscences of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries rather than on the basis of the socialpolitical and social-psychological analysis of the Ukrainian situation.
30. SIMON DUBNOV & BENZION DINUR, TWO CONCEPTS OF THE REBIRTH OF ISRAEL
101 (1990).
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C. The Religious Minorities in Public Opinion

According to a 2001 poll, more than 66% of the adult population in Ukraine declared their religiosity. Among this number, more
than 70% considered themselves Orthodox believers and nearly 17%
considered themselves Eastern Rites Catholics. The correlation between religious activity and awareness of religious doctrine, on the
one hand, and the critical attitude to the precepts of other faiths, on
the other hand, is doubtless. At the same time, one can describe the
attitude of the population at large toward religious and ethnic minorities as being tolerant rather than hostile. Thus, for example, according to the Socis-Gallup Poll, 33% of respondents preferred to
live in a society where religious and ethnic minorities must restrict
their claims and adjust to the majority of citizens. At the same time,
41% of respondents did not wish to live in such a society and 25%
did not declare their preference. It is of interest that in Galychyna—
the three regions of the western Ukraine justifiably considered to be
the bastion of Ukrainian nationalism—those who thought that minorities should restrict their claims were only 19% of the population.
In Crimea, where the Russian majority painfully observed the return
of the Crimean Tatars to their historical homeland, 61% thought that
minorities should restrict their claims. At the same time, activity of
foreign missions caused a rather critical reaction in public opinion.
Only 7.2% of the Kievites questioned by the Ukrainian Sociology
Service in 1997 supported activity of foreign missions; 38.7% were
indifferent to missionary activity, and 17.6% were of the opinion that
such activity must be prohibited completely.
D. The Established Churches and Religious Minorities
As a rule, the hierarchy of the Orthodox churches abstains from
criticizing religious minorities that are traditional for Ukraine, such
as Jews, Muslims, Reformists, Baptists, and Pentecostals. At the same
time, Orthodox hierarchs sharply criticize the activity of the Roman
Catholic Church in Ukraine, accusing it of proselytizing and expanding on the east. Even though the Catholic community in Ukraine (of
the Latin and Eastern rites together) is the largest among the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Orthodox hierarchs under the
jurisdiction of Moscow Patriarchate alone managed until now to
block the visit of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine and the opening of
the Ukrainian embassy in the Holy See.
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The Orthodox churches and the Greek-Catholic church demonstrate a most hostile attitude to the foreign religious missions and
new religious movements (“NRM”). In fact, the ambition to put
aside these rivals became one of the most important goals of the
church administrations. The church hierarchs appeal constantly to
the public, to the local authorities, and to the Ukrainian government
for protection against foreign missionaries and the NRM.
The Orthodox hierarchs brought forward demands of this kind
during meetings of the religious leaders with President L. Kravchuk
in June 1994, with President L. Kuchma in July 1994 and in March
1996, and with the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament, O.
Moroz, in December 1994.
E. The Problem of the Orthodox-Jewish Dialogue
The core problem with dialogue in Ukraine between Jews and
Orthodox believers (“Orthodox-Jewish dialogue”) is that such dialogue essentially does not exist. In the post-Soviet history of dialogue between Orthodox believers and Jewish believers, the most
prominent event was perhaps the address of the Moscow Patriarch
Alexiy II, whose jurisdiction includes 70% of the Orthodox Ukrainian parishes, before the representatives of the Jewish community of
New York. The head of the Russian Orthodox church did not propose any new approaches in the framework for eliminating antagonism between Orthodoxy and Judaism. The Patriarch made references to the ideas of famous hierarchs of the last century. The
Patriarch restated the brilliant thesis that “[w]e [the Orthodox] are
separated from Jews because we are ‘not yet fully Christians,’ and
they . . . are separated from us because they are ‘not fully Jews.’”31 In
other words, the cause of the resentment of the Orthodox fundamentalists was simply their unwillingness to progress beyond the Orthodox-Jewish dialogue of more than a century ago. It was an excellent test to verify the health of the church organism. This test has
demonstrated that the organism is not quite healthy, even if there are
no other indications of its ailment.
One of the predominant sources of anti-Semitism in Ukraine

31. Patriarch Aleksi II, Your Prophets Are Our Prophets, in CHRISTIANITY AFTER
COMMUNISM: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL STRUGGLE IN RUSSIA 103, 103–06 (Niels
C. Nielsen, Jr. ed., 1994). This thesis was originally proffered by Nikanor Brovkovitch, the
nineteenth century Herson and Odessa Archbishop.
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may not be domestic anti-Semitism. Even the anti-Semitism of the
intellectuals may not be the most fruitful source because none of the
influential political forces in Ukraine raise the standard of antiSemitism. However, the anti-Semitism of theologians may really become a serious problem. Today the anti-Semitism of theologians is
free from its extreme manifestations and does not charge the entire
Jewish people with the murder of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, the attitude of Orthodox believers to Jews still rests on the old premise that
the Old and New Testament are contradistinguished. The salvation
of Jews is not annihilated, but it is postponed. The Judaism of Jesus
Christ has value only as a precursor of Christianity; after Jesus Christ,
Judaism loses all its value. Such an approach negates any selfsufficiency of Judaism, eliminates the uniqueness of Judaism’s spiritual experience, and disallows the competent status of Judaism in the
dialogue. Thus, the problem of the Orthodox-Jewish dialogue, and
even of the broader Christian-Jewish dialogue, is the problem of
each partner in the dialogue renouncing possession of the universal
truth.
F. The State Versus Foreign Missionaries and the NRM
Towards the end of 1993, the government in Kiev began to take
a more severe attitude toward foreign missions, the communities created by them, and the NRM. This severe attitude developed because
the state authority experienced pressure from the hierarchs of the
historical churches, from the mass media, and from the anticult
movement that became considerably stronger during the trial of the
leaders of the White Brotherhood. The political position of the government also proved to be a factor. In December 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Amendment to Article 24 of the Law on
“Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” that was directed against foreign missionary activity. (This amendment is discussed in more detail below.) During the years that followed, statements of officials revealed the strengthening of the movement
against so-called totalitarian destructive sects and missionaries from
abroad. During celebrations of the fifth anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, President L. Kuchma spoke openly against the “buildup of the active foreign missionary organizations in the Ukrainian religious space.”32
32. See RABOCHAYA GAZETA (WORKING NEWSPAPER) (Kiev), Aug. 28, 1996.
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The activity of foreign missionaries in Ukraine as well as in other
post-Soviet countries was not always flawless. The president of the
Slavic Gospel Association, Peter Deineka, admits: “The hostile reaction on the Western missions is often caused by the doubtful actions
of separate missionaries. Some Western missions committed morally
doubtful or harmful actions [including], for example, attack on the
Orthodox Church.”33 At the same time, one can easily understand
the desire of the Ukrainian political elite to use the myth of “the
sect’s danger.” Under the conditions of this many-sided and
exhausting interchurch conflict, this “danger” operated as an
external factor in reconciling competing church institutions.
Recently, the pro-government mass media and the leftist press
have clamored against “sects.” After part of the 50,000 faithful of
the Charismatic community supported the opposition party, led by
former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Pavlo Lazarenko, the problem of
“sects” became the central point of the political struggle. The activity of the Charismatic community, as reported by the opposition
press, was even discussed at a session of the National Security Council.
V. CHURCH, STATE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
The making of a new system of church-state relations in Ukraine
proceeded against the background of the most severe economical crisis, a sharp political struggle, and the manifestation of previously latent, interchurch conflicts.
A. The Interchurch Conflicts
First, the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
created a new reality in Ukrainian religious life. This church of almost five million members had been the catacomb church and was
considerably decimated, but not completely annihilated, by the
Communist regime. Legalization of this church was not recognized
by the Orthodox hierarchy and believers. As a result, a severe struggle between Orthodox and Greek-Catholic powers arose in western
Ukraine over which church would have a hold on the believers and

33. MARK SMIRNOV & GEORGIJ AVVAKUMOV, RELIGION UND GESELLSHAFT IM
POSTSOVJETISCHEN RAUM 106 (1996).
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achieve the dominant position in the parceling of church buildings
and property.34
This struggle, which was accompanied by a physical fray between
believers of the conflicting churches in the early 1990s, has already
passed the most serious stage of its development but is still far from
being fully reconciled.
The problems of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine are, in large
part, a reflection of the Ukrainian historical drama or, at the least,
adequate reflections of the political and cultural contradictions in
Ukrainian society and the conflict of different identities and different
models of historical memory. The idea of separation from Moscow
Patriarchate has existed from the very beginning, when the Kiev
Metropolia was transmitted to Moscow Patriarchate from Constantinople Patriarchate in 1686. This idea was not entirely obliterated
during the next three hundred years during the existence of the Kiev
Metropolia as part of the Russian Orthodox Church; unassimilated
elements of the idea were always present. On the other hand, historical interpretations of Ukrainian Orthodoxy—that the Russian
Church is something external and alien to the Orthodox Church in
Ukraine—certainly do not take historical facts into consideration.
It is clear that in the eighteenth century Kiev had a great influence on the formation of the Russian Orthodoxy personality, which
is considered important by some theologians and historians. At the
same time, it is obvious that historians have no right to consider the
opposite influence based only on the facts of the russification of
Ukraine with the help of the Orthodox Church.
In the twentieth century, the movement for Ukrainian independence occurred simultaneously with the movement for the independence of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Ultimately, while part of
the Orthodox people considered this independence to be a selfsufficient value, the rest of the Orthodox people did not view independence in the same way.
The reappearance on Europe’s political map of several newly independent states at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s led the Orthodox churches in these countries to seek independence or to change their jurisdiction. This desire has met strong
34. See R.G. Weakland, Crisis in Orthodox-Catholic Relations: Challenges and Hopes, in
166 AMERICA, no. 2.; Serge Keleher, Out of the Catacombs: The Greek-Catholic Church in
Ukraine, in 19 RELIGION IN COMMUNIST LANDS 251, 251–63 (1991); J. Erickson, A New
Crisis in Catholic Orthodox Dialogue, in 27 ECUMENISM, no. 107 (1992).
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resistance from some Orthodox capitals and has resulted in the outbreak of nationalistic intolerance. New zones of contradiction
emerged in Europe. The situation has been further aggravated with
the involvement of state resources and the recognition of this situation’s relevance to international relations (as in Ukraine, Estonia,
Moldova, and Macedonia).
But the Orthodoxy in Ukraine happened to be in the most dramatic condition. In Ukraine, three Orthodox Churches exist: (1)
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Partiarchate (“UOCMP”),
which has more than 9500 parishes, 8000 priests, 131 monasteries
with 3700 monks and nuns, and 15 theological institutions with
4100 students; (2) Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate
(“UOCKP”), which is headed by Patriarch Filaret and is anathematized by the Russian Church and has 3050 parishes, 2400 priests, 28
monasteries, and 15 theological schools with 1600 students; and (3)
UAOC, which is seeking to be under the jurisdiction of the
Constantinople Patriarchate, and has more than 1050 parishes, 3
monasteries, and 8 theological schools.
Orthodox congregations make up 53% of all religious organizations with registered charters. In this sense, Ukraine cannot be regarded as entirely Orthodox. Approximately 8% to 9% of adults belong to the Roman and Greek Catholic churches; the membership of
Protestant denominations who were baptized and recorded in the
Church books numbers about one million.
However, more than half of all respondents surveyed declared
that they belonged to the Orthodox church. Surprisingly, most of
them do not belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox church of Moscow
Patriarchate, but rather they belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of Kiev Patriarchate.
From 25% to 32% of those surveyed declared that they belonged
to the UOCKP, from 7% to 12% declared that they belonged to the
UOCMP, and from 0.5% to 2% declared that they belonged to the
UAOC. For those who are acquainted with the realities of Ukrainian
religious life, there can only be one explanation for these results. By
declaring that he or she belongs to the Kiev and not to the Moscow
Patriarchate, a person declares his or her identity with a Ukrainian
vector. Furthermore, most respondents are nominal Christians—
“nonpracticing” and, sometimes “nonbelieving,” Orthodox members.
On the other hand, the research indicated that 12.2% of the Do472
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netsk region’s population and 35.3% of Simferopol’s population belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. Yet in Donetsk, at least officially, there is no such church and, in Simferopol, less than ten such
churches exist compared with three hundred congregations of
UOCMP. Clearly, these results are a demonstration of Russian identity in these regions.
Where the survey form allowed the choice “an Orthodox who
did not determine his position regarding the denomination,” (as
proposed by SOCIS-Gallup-Ukraine service in 1997) 40% of the respondents in some regions chose this response.
Obviously, at least in three post-Soviet republics—Russia,
Ukraine, and especially in Belorussia—there are people who deal
with real difficulties in the sense of their identity. They do not feel
that they are “Soviet people” because of their political convictions,
but they cannot equate themselves with any one ethnic commonality—Ukrainian, Russian, or Belorussian. The survey of public opinion done in 2000 in Ukraine showed that 39% of those surveyed
identified themselves first of all according to the place where they
live (region, city, village); 35% identified themselves with Ukraine;
10% still consider themselves as Soviet people; and only 2% consider
themselves as belonging to Europe.
Once more, the conflict among Orthodox churches themselves,
which is, more or less, an adequate reflection of (a) the social, political, and cultural contradictions of Ukrainian society and (b) the distinctions in the levels of national self-realization, seems to be even
more dramatic. The basis of this conflict is the different attitudes
about the sovereignty and independence that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has obtained from the Moscow Patriarchate. The Ecumenical Patriarchate and other local Orthodox churches now recognize only one Ukrainian Orthodox Church—the one under the
Moscow jurisdiction. Both the Ukrainian Authocephalous Orthodox
Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are labeled by Moscow
Patriarchate as “heretic splits.” However, having proclaimed the entire territory of the former Soviet Union as “canonical territory” of
the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox Church has found
itself in a state of “canonical war,” not only with Ukrainian Orthodox churches but also with the Constantinople and Romanian Orthodox churches. The subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate is
completely unjustifiable and offensive for one part of the Orthodox
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believers while the other part considers such a subordination to be a
quite normal phenomenon.
As of mid-1999, conflicts among the Ukrainian Orthodox
churches and conflicts between the Ukrainian Orthodox churches
and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church were registered in 350
population points (populated localities) in Ukraine. One obstacle to
the regulation of these conflicts is the transient nature of society because the conflicts may not be localized and solved separately. On
the contrary, the transient nature of these conflicts creates new problems by creating the so-called “domino effect.”
B. Religious Freedom and Religious Human Rights in Ukraine
As to human rights, Ukraine has relatively good figures in the
sphere of religious freedom and religious human rights. Ukraine,
which is not “the best student” in the school of democracy for postCommunist countries, has relatively decent standards in the sphere
of religious freedom for four principal reasons. The first reason is the
religious configuration of Ukraine. The second reason is the weakness of Ukrainian nationalism and the lack of strict denominational
identity, which does not allow the establishment of a religious monopoly. Ukrainian national myth is not really connected with religion. When we speak about the Ukrainian person, we do not mean
the religious identity as we do when we speak about Poles, Serbs,
Georgians, or Croatians. The third reason, which in my opinion is
very important, is the type of religious culture. Because the essence
of post-Communist religious changes is the restoration of religious
cultural types that have been created over centuries and were destroyed to a certain extent by Communist regimes, Ukrainian religious cultural types need to be considered separately. However, at
the present time, the Ukrainian religious culture has a high level of
tolerance toward other believers. The “Ukrainian Project,” which
was largely based on the intentions of nineteenth century Galychyna
thinkers who believed that the western Ukraine should not be Polish, Austrian, Russian, nor Muscovite but instead part of a great
Ukrainian nation, meant the deliberate abstraction of religious differences between Catholics and Orthodox. In his 1906 article,
Ukraine and Galychina, Michailo Hrushevs’ky warned the compatriots of the reoccurring danger of Serbs and Croats, religiously divided
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nations which have arisen on the common ethnic base.35 The final
reason is that religious freedom in Ukraine never threatened the government’s position as, for instance, the freedom of speech can.
Respectively, the Ukrainian government had no reason to seek the
destruction of religious freedom.
C. Orthodox Churches and Human Rights Issues
Obviously, the situation of religious human rights in Ukraine
cannot be considered stable. One can ask how interested Ukrainian
Orthodox people are with human rights issues.
By reviewing the materials of Bishops Councils and Synods of
Ukrainian Orthodox churches; All-Church Meetings and Conferences; interviews with church leaders by mass media; various statements, approvals, and reports of meetings with Ukrainian political
leaders, one can roughly create the following structure of concerns.
First, some significant problems are the issues of returning facilities
and properties to the church, of loosening the tax burden, of preventing the possible privatization of former church properties, and of
creating advantages for getting humanitarian aid.
A second concern is the providing of a more qualified presence in
different social spheres, where the social service needs to be accompanied with apostolic service and where the church has access to organized and very important social institutions—schools and the military.
Finally, the third issue, where the church’s concern with the affairs of the state and society is obvious, is the issue of competitive activities of other religious organizations, both new and nontraditional
for Ukraine. These organizations are founded overseas or are simply
Orthodox churches of different jurisdictions. The sphere of human
rights and freedoms is not the center of concern. Among a few
church statements is found an initiative of the leaders of UOCMP
regarding amnesty for prisoners due to the two thousand-year anniversary of Jesus’ birth and the speech of the late UAOC primate
Dimitry against the delay of salary payments.
In fact, in recent years, the only mass movement for the right not
to pay taxes, a right not to aggravate one’s personal conscience by
“Caesar’s” demand, was the refusal of about fifty-thousand faithful
35. Michailo Hrushevs’ky, Ukraine and Galychina, in 36 LITERATURNO-NAUKOVIJ
VISTNIK (1906).
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followers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate to have individual identification codes. In this case, the theological basis of the problem and its social-church status were not
considered. It is quite indicative that the UOCMP, having regained a
voice after seventy years of silence, focused on the idea of not accepting identification codes, yet did not consider expressing its position
regarding the main social problems or evaluating the events and
processes which had changed living conditions and put people in the
position of moral choice. This fact suggests the social marginalization of the Church.
Once again in Ukrainian history, the government faced believers
determined to suffer rather than accept the government burden because of ideas that the believers considered ontologically important.
Characteristically, the majority of officials considered these ideas to
be senseless. Finally, the government was forced to provide the believers with a softer alternative. This incident is a very important
precedent in modern Ukrainian history.
D. Attitudes of the Orthodox Clergy Toward Human
Rights Issues: The Case of Ukraine
The relation of Orthodox churches toward religious freedom
problems and human rights issues still has not been determined.
During the year 2000, I surveyed ninety-four Orthodox priests of all
three jurisdictions in seven Ukrainian regions. My survey proceeded
as a standard interview, lasting sometimes for two hours and covering the whole range of problems. Some of my results are listed below:36
Which of the statements do you agree with?
• Individual human rights are more important than state and
society interests—25.5%
• State and society interests are more important than individual
human rights—67%
• Private property is a natural and inalienable individual right—
47.8%
36. Included in these percentages are those who answered, “I absolutely agree,” and, “I
disagree.” Those who answered, “I agree and disagree,” “No response,” or, “I am not sure,”
are not included.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Private property is the source of sin, wars, and hatred—38.3%
The death penalty is not allowed in any circumstance—11.7%
The death penalty in some cases is needed—82.9%
Equality is more important than freedom—52.1%
Freedom is more important than equality—45.7%
Religious freedom can be limited only in cases where its manifestation threatens life, health, and freedoms of other people—18.1%
Preaching of false teachings is not religious freedom and needs
to be limited—75.5%
Democracy for Ukraine is an untimely issue—30.9%
Ukraine suffers from a lack of democracy—51.1%
Freedom of mass media is very important to me—9.6%
Freedom of mass media is not very important to me—88.3%
Order in the country is more important than freedom—61.7%
Freedom is more important than order in the country—38.3%

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The interviews with Orthodox clergy show that the most painful
problem for the Orthodox mentality is the protection of collective
identity. In fact, in each interview the concern about the loss of Orthodox identity was expressed. In the western Ukraine, the priests
see the source of this problem as the work of the Ukrainian Greek
Catholic and Roman Catholic Churches, but in the eastern Ukraine,
the priests see the source of this problem as the work of western missionaries and new religious movements.
In general, the persons who were interviewed tended to emphasize duties more than rights. They also insisted on the necessity to
eliminate religious freedoms for religions that are nontraditional in
Ukraine and to prohibit such religious groups that, in their opinion,
are “sects” or “cults.” Approximately 70% of all who were interviewed think that the Ukrainian legal system is too liberal and does
not contain mechanisms of protection against the so-called “totalitarian sects.” More than half of them think that it is necessary to reconsider the Ukrainian system of church-state relations.
E. Religious Intolerance
The interreligion conflicts of the past now remain the principal
source of religious intolerance in contemporary Ukraine. The struggle was accompanied by skirmishes both among the believers of different churches and between believers and militia detachments in a
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number of populated localities in western Ukraine. In this region,
the situation was particularly grave in 1989–1991. Afterward, a certain normalization process occurred (though the process was much
slower than expected by the Ukrainian society).
The Ukrainian state explicitly manifested religious intolerance
when former President Leonid Kravchuk rendered unilateral assistance to one of the churches in conflict—the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. The fact that most of the religious
institutions have their centers outside of Ukraine is a particular concern for the newly established Ukrainian state, particularly for the
former presidential administration of L. Kravchuk. Immediately following the declaration of Ukrainian independence, this administration took measures to block the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate, which from the perspective of national interests was viewed as
the least desirable foreign religious center. The government, in turn,
assisted the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in its desire to establish
complete canonical independence. This attempt, however, was carried out in the absence of adequate political, canonical, and juridical
expertise and without taking into account the given sociocultural and
sociophsychological context. Many criticized this policy in fear that
the policy might result in the foundation of an established church.
President Leonid Kuchma, elected in 1994, recognized this policy to
be wrong and one that contradicted the law and interests of Ukraine.
The simultaneous existence of several centers of religious influence in Ukraine does not allow any church to completely dominate
and to suppress religious minorities, as happens quite often in a
number of the post-Communist countries. Nevertheless, separate
cases of intolerance manifested by the local authorities toward religious minorities in Ukraine were documented. One of the most wellknown of these cases was the decision of the Chervonograd City
Council in 1993 in the Lviv region to prohibit Jehovah’s Witnesses
activity on city territory. This decision was abolished by the public
prosecutor of the Lviv region as unlawful.
F. Politicization of Religious Life
The next problem that has had a serious impact on church-state
relations is the abnormal politicization of the churches. In Ukraine,
where the national idea has not yet become the value common to all
and where there is significant diversity in the cultural orientations of
different regions, religious institutions occupy a special position. On
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the background of an undeveloped party system and weak tradeunions, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church exists as a deeply stratified
structure, a reliable system of communication and well adjusted over
the centuries, possessing the means of transplanting quite sophisticated ideas into the fabric of ordinary consciousness. These features
make the Ukrainian Orthodox Church exceptionally attractive for
persons and groups striving to acquire or preserve positions of
power.
The representatives of the post-Communist elite view the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a means of political or ethnic mobilization, as an instrument through which to legitimate their regime or
to transmit certain ideas. Nearly no one looks at the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as what it should be: a specific spiritual phenomenon. This statement is not meant to be an accusation but simply a
statement of objective reality. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, on
the other hand, is altering the social composition of the country in
its own specific fashion, which is very different from the way that lay
institutions approach this matter. Arnold Toynbee once wrote that
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church accomplishes social transformation
through the “spiritual progress of individual souls.”37 Neither the
government nor society at large is ready to accept the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in a role of moral arbitrator, or even a moral opponent, that steadfastly uncovers social disorders and causes considerable embarrassment for the powers that be.
At the same time, religion in Ukraine very largely functions as a
means of political, cultural, and ethnic mobilization. We can speak
about the presence of a quite definite correlation between a declaration of belonging to some particular Ukrainian Orthodox Church
and political preference and behavior.
The 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine
were particularly illustrative in this context. Given the fact that in
Ukraine several religions are, in effect, competing with each other,
these elections, indeed, helped create a situation in which the various
churches are being transformed into parties.
And at last, the general problems of development of the postSoviet societies—that is the legal nihilism of the population, the contradictions between the branches of authority, the corruption, and
the attempts of the political elite to use churches as a tool for the re37. 2 ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 80 (1957).

479

YEL-FIN.DOC

6/6/02 10:27 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2002

alization of their own projects—have appeared to be the most serious
obstacle in the process of overcoming the Communist heritage in the
sphere of church-state relations.
G. The Ukrainian Government’s Church Policy
The Ukrainian government, de jure, has its own policy concerning religious organizations and the faithful. This policy, at the very
least, was legalized in Article 30 of the Ukrainian Law, “On the
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations.”38 However,
the precise meaning of this policy has yet to be determined. Moreover, it is still too early to speak about a single governmental policy
in Ukraine. This policy, on the one hand, is a result of the way that
larger issues are decided in the competition between various interested political forces and in the internecine struggles between competing governmental structures. On the other hand, the policy
emerges in the struggle between the various religious institutions in
their desire to place people into positions of power, which they find
convenient. This policy constantly vacillates between trying to preserve a positive liberal image and secure guaranteed liberties, and the
attempt to preserve the most dependable control of the state over religious organizations and to secure greater latitude and possibilities
of influence over the church.
VI. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
In these conditions, Ukraine, however, has managed to achieve
very essential successes in providing religious freedom. We should,
evidently, agree with those researchers who consider the achievement
in this area as the most serious of all the post-Communist changes in
Ukraine.
A. The 1991 Law: Main Provisions
In April 1991, the Ukrainian parliament accepted the Law “On
the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” (“1991
Law”), which mainly follows the stipulations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human
Rights, as well as other European Conventions. In many aspects, the
Ukrainian model of church-state relations turned out to be more
38. UKR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 30 (1996).
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similar to the American model than to the European ones: the
Ukrainian model includes the principle of church non-establishment,
the strict separation of church from state and state from church, and
the equality of all the religions before the law. Seri Plokhy has argued
that, even though Ukraine’s geographic location would seem to dictate a European form of church-state relations, Ukraine’s choice of
the American version of church-state relations makes sense because
Ukraine, like America, was established by colonization with an “advancing frontier” mentality. Thereto, the 1991 Law provides that
when an international treaty, the signatory of which is Ukraine, establishes norms other than those which are stipulated by the Ukrainian legislation on freedom of conscience, then the norms of the international treaty apply. In accordance with Article 18, Paragraph 3
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) as well as with Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the European
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1991 Law introduces only those restrictions which are
necessary to maintain public order and safety, lives, health, and morals as well as rights and freedoms of other citizens. At the same time,
the Ukrainian law establishes a broader frame of religious liberty as
compared with ICCPR Article 18, Paragraph 1. While ICCPR defines two meanings of the right of thought, conscience, and religion,
namely the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his or
her choice, and the freedom to manifest religion in different manners, then the 1991 Law introduces two more meanings of this freedom, namely, the rights to change religions or convictions and to
expand not only religious but also atheistic convictions.
The Ukrainian legislation does not establish differences in the legal status of religious organizations of different confessions, does not
create a division of the religious organizations on the basis of traditional and nontraditional ones, does not establish any trial period for
a religious community to obtain the status of a legal entity, does not
limit the right to create a religious organization to the citizens of
Ukraine, and does not provide that only Ukrainian citizens can be
leaders of churches.39
39. However, the amendment enacted in 1993 does distinguish between the religious
freedoms of citizens and foreigners. Foreign citizens who are temporarily in the Ukraine may
preach or practice their religious activities “only in those religious organizations on whose invitations they came, and upon an official agreement with the state body which has registered the
statute of the corresponding religious organization.” Amended Ukrainian Act, HANDBOOK OF
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At the same time, the Ukrainian legislation does differentiate between the legal status of religious organizations and the legal status
of public organizations. Religious organizations are formed primarily
to satisfy religious needs and to facilitate the expression of religious
feelings. Religious organizations do not participate in the activity of
political parties, do not conduct propaganda during election campaigns, and do not finance candidates of the bodies of state authority.40 Article 5 of the 1991 Law obliges the state bodies to take into
account the canonical structure of churches.
The state also has an obligation to overcome the negative church
policy of the previous regime; the state has not accepted such an obligation with respect to the political parties. The state eliminated the
problem of the legalization of religious organizations, recognizing
them to be legal already on the basis of the mere fact of their creation (notice to the bodies of authority is not obligatory).
At the same time, as in many post-Communist countries,
Ukrainian law is marked by the spirit of statism. The state appropriates for itself numerous functions unusual for democratic states. For
instance, according to the law, the state should defend religious organizations’ rights and interests that are legitimate and should encourage tolerance among both the religious and the atheist.
B. Registration System for Religious Organizations
To receive legal entity status, the religious organization registers
its charter. The registration of the charter automatically confers legal
entity status on the religious organization. To register its charter, the
religious community must have at least ten members. Religious
communities must register at the regional office; religious centers,
monasteries, theological schools, missions, and brotherhoods must
register at the Ukrainian State Committee for Religious Affairs. The
registration procedure is rather simple. The registration of a religious
organization’s charter, unlike the charters of political parties and
public organizations, is performed free of charge.

COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, art. 24 (1993); see also Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and
the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251,
315.
40. See UKR. CONST. ch. 1, art. 5 (1996).
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C. Financial Condition of Religious Organizations

The system of church-state relations in Ukraine separates the
church and state in a rather strict manner. The state provides no financial subsidies—neither direct nor indirect—to religious organizations. However, the state considers itself to be obliged to compensate churches for the enormous damage that they suffered from 1917
to 1985. At the time of the Communist regime and during the Nazi
invasion of Ukraine, approximately 14,500 church buildings were
destroyed or used for non-religious purposes. Over the past five
years, more than 3000 church buildings have been returned to religious organizations, and the government has authorized the return
of 150 more buildings in response to pleas from churches. Nevertheless, only 65% of the religious communities of Ukraine presently have
temples, mosques, synagogues, or prayer houses. For this reason,
3500 lots have been allocated, without charge, to religious organizations for the construction of church buildings. The government has
extended this privilege not only to the traditional churches but also
to religious organizations that have appeared in Ukraine in recent
years.
D. The Problem of Returning Church Property
Nevertheless, the problem of returning property to churches remains one of the most difficult ones in church-state relations. First,
the state has not been able to return more than 100 church buildings
that are now used as museums, picture galleries, hospitals, schools,
and other establishments of culture and education, which presently
do not have other locations to which to move. Furthermore, problems arise where two or more religious communities, which were
formally one religious community, claim rights in the same building.
Local authorities have shown certain biases in handling such situations. During the last year, the courts have considered forty-four
cases of religious organizations concerning the decisions of state
bodies on property issues. In eighteen cases—that is, in more than
40% of the cases—the decisions of the local authorities were recognized to be invalid and the courts allowed the appeals of the religious
organizations.
Finally, at the present time the state is only trying to solve the
problem of returning buildings and property used for worship to the
religious organizations. However, the Recommendation of the Par483
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liament Assembly of the Council of Europe concerning the acceptance of Ukraine to the Council of Europe (1995) expresses the necessity of a legal solution to problems dealing with the return of all
church property, not just that part of it which is used for worship
purposes. A presidential decree provides favorable conditions for solution to this problem but preliminary work is only in its initial
stage.41
E. Attempts to Reconsider the New Ukrainian
System of Church-State Relations
At the beginning of the formation of the model for church-state
relations in the independent Ukraine, opponents attempted to torpedo this model. The opponents of the existing model, which fully
complies with the international legal acts to which Ukraine is a signatory, were fighting and are continuing to fight for the following positions:
1. Ukraine is not a country of emigrants; it has a millennial
Christian tradition. An exceptional role in the formation of this tradition is attributed to Orthodoxy and Greek-Catholicism. Therefore,
the Orthodox Church and Greek-Catholic Church have the right to
receive a special status.
2. The historical churches of Ukraine were extremely weakened
by the Communist regime; therefore, they are not capable of competing with the foreign religious institutions and missions, which are
well organized and have powerful financial support. Thus, the historical churches have the right to receive legally established privileges.
3. A sharp increase in the number of religious organizations created by foreign missionaries may lead to a radical change in the religious map of Ukraine, resulting in a loss of Ukrainian originality.42
Therefore, a reliable legislative barrier must be erected to the expansion of “foreign religions.”
4. The religious situation in Ukraine has a very peculiar feature:
the religious organizations have the highest rating of the people’s

41. Presidential Decree, On Urgent Measures for Combating the Negative Consequences of
Totalitarian Policies of the Former Soviet Union Regarding Religion and Restoration of the
Violated Rights of Churches and Religious Organizations (March 21, 2002).
42. See Stahnke, supra note 39, at 314.
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confidence. They have a real influence on the political behavior of
citizens. Yet, the majority of the religious organizations have their
church administrative centers beyond the borders of Ukraine. One of
the biggest churches in Ukraine (38% of all the communities officially registered) is under the jurisdiction of Moscow Patriarchate,
which has no sympathy to Ukrainian independence and statehood.
Under these circumstances, the state must intervene actively into religious affairs, giving special support to those churches that are helping the Ukrainian people in establishing the young Ukrainian state in
its national rebirth. Furthermore, the state must influence, in a
proper way, those churches that do not take part in these processes.
5. In many European countries, there exist the established
churches and distinctions in the status of religious organizations of
different confessions. This fact does not prevent these countries from
being members of the Council of Europe and from having an esteemed reputation on human rights and religious liberties.
The hierarchy of the historical churches is the group that is especially persistent in its efforts to impose restrictions and even prohibitions on the activity of foreign missionaries. In fact, one of the main
goals of many church administrations has become the opposition to
foreign missionaries and the appealing to the state machinery for
help in this struggle with them.43
The arguments mentioned above seem to be reasonable if one
does not take into consideration the country’s political and cultural
context as well as the level of Ukrainian officials’ legal conscience. In
the given conditions, only a direct prohibition against establishing
any advantages or restrictions of one religion in relation to others
can more or less effectively curb the discrimination against religious
minorities.
The anticult movement, which demands special legislation for
regulating the activity of new religious movements, strongly insists
on making changes in the Ukrainian model of church-state relations.
In contrast to the western anticult movement, this movement in
Ukraine is not as strongly “institutionalized.” However, the movement is based on the support (at least the moral support) of a significant part of the population and the church hierarchy. A wide spectrum of the political parties, from the left to the right, support this
43. See id. at 313.
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movement, as do some officials who hope to unite the historical
churches on the basis “of the threats from the sects.”
The Amendment to Article 24 of the 1991 Law, adopted on December 23, 1993, is one of the most serious concessions to the
forces striving to change the new Ukrainian model of church-state
relations. This amendment was adopted one month after the attempt
of “The White Brotherhood” to seize the Sophia Cathedral in Kiev
and while a strong anticult wave existed in society. The public opinion was so highly excited that society showed practically no reaction
to the obvious failure of this amendment to place any limitation on
the misuse of religion to the detriment of the health and life of the
citizens.
The Amendment to Article 24 of the 1991 Law stated:
Clergymen, preachers of religion, instructors (teachers) and other
representatives of foreign organizations who are foreign citizens
temporarily staying in Ukraine, may preach religious dogmas, perform religious rites and practice other canonic activities only in
those religious organizations on whose invitations they came, and
upon an official agreement with the state body which has registered
the statute of the corresponding religious organization.44

It is evident that such an Amendment was in contradiction with
the fundamental principles of the Ukrainian legislation on freedom
of conscience. This amendment attracted severe criticism both in
Ukraine and abroad.45
In a report on religious freedom, the U.S. State Department
made the reasonable claim that the 1993 Amendment restricts the
activities of non-native religious organizations and that, “[i]n addition, local officials have occasionally impeded the activities of foreign
religious workers.”46 Yet in 1994, after the amendment had been introduced, Ukraine remained the more favorable place of foreign mis44. Amended Ukrainian Act, HANDBOOK OF THE COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS,
art. 24 (1993); see also Howard L. Biddulph, Religious Liberty and the Ukrainian State: Nationalism Versus Equal Protection, 1995 BYU L. REV. 321, 339 (quoting the 1993 Amendment to Article 24).
45. See COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN THE OSCE: PRESENT AND FUTURE 37–50 (1999) (briefing of the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe held Sept. 27, 1995); Biddulph, supra note 44, at 339–
41.
46. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: FOCUS ON CHRISTIANS, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/
970722_relig_rpt_christian.html (July 27, 1997).
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sionaries among all post-Communist countries.47
F. The 1996 Ukrainian Constitution
The discussions concerning the system of church-state relations
also affected work on the Constitution of Ukraine, which was
adopted in June 1996. Some political parties and movements, such
as the Project of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, submitted
to the constitution’s drafters a proposal for a cardinal revision of the
system that already existed. Nevertheless, the Constitution states that
“no religion can be recognized by the state as an obligatory religion.”48 The Constitution separates church and state as well as school
and church. The Constitution asserts that the right to freedom of religion may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary to protect public order, health, morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.49 In addition, the Constitution provides that the state will promote the development of
ethnic, cultural, language, and religious originality of the national
minorities.50 Part 2 of Article 35 of the Ukrainian Constitution provides for substitution of mandatory military duty by an alternative
service.51
Thus, the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine has consolidated the
model of church-state relations that was formed on the basis of the
1991 Law.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the course of recent years, a new system of church-state relations has been formed in Ukraine; this system complies with the international legal acts to which the Ukrainian state is a signatory. The
gravest problems in church-state relations in Ukraine are the following: (a) the multilateral, interchurch conflict that makes the process
of harmonizing relations between the churches and the state compli-

47. In 1994, 1113 foreign Protestant missionaries worked in Ukraine, as compared with
505 in Russia, 213 in Hungary, 182 in Albania, 165 in Romania, 87 in Czech Republic, 77 in
Bulgaria, 77 in Poland, 53 in Serbia, and 45 in Estonia. See East-West Church and Ministry
Report 2, no. 1.
48. UKR. CONST. ch 2, art. 35 (1996).
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 1.
51. Law of Ukraine on Alternative Service (adopted May 1992).
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cated; (b) the absence of carefully developed mechanisms for the realization of legislation on freedom of conscience (this absence is a
consequence of the under development of the legal base in the
Ukrainian state); and (c) the return of property taken from churches
by the Soviet regime and the inefficient executive bodies that prevent
the strict implementation of the law in this area.
The Constitution of 1996 has crystallized the existing system of
church-state relations. However, there are quite powerful forces in
Ukraine striving to revise the principles of this system. Russia’s example will make, without fail, these forces more active in the near future.
The problems in the relations between the church and state cannot be solved separately from the many other social and political
problems existing in Ukraine. The solution to these problems is
closely connected with the strengthening of the civil society and with
the overcoming of the Communist heritage and post-Communist
pathologies.
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